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EUTHANASIA, MORALITY, AND LAW
ARTICLE
John Finnis*
I
Arguments for legalising euthanasia rely on claims about auton-
omy rights, or claims about political pluralism, or on both sorts of
claim. My response will make three main points.
First, those demanding this legalisation have shirked their ele-
mentary obligation to describe the alleged right, identify who has it,
and delineate its boundaries as a right supposed to trump other
goods, interests, and the wellbeing or rights of others.
Second, they have neglected, or at best hugely underestimated,
the casualties who would be, and in some places already are being,
created by the success of their campaign. That is to say, they are ne-
glecting basic responsibilities of fairness and justice.
Third, they proceed on an inadmissible conception of the nature
and value of human life and dignity-on a theory which should be
rejected for the same sorts of reasons of equality and dignity that lead
us to reject as a matter of principle1 the alleged right (often recog-
nised in former societies) to free yourself from perhaps crushing bur-
dens by selling yourself into slavery.
* Professor of Law & Legal Philosophy, Oxford University; Biolchini Pro-
fessor of Law, University of Notre Dame. This Essay is an expansion of the
comments Professor Finnis delivered at the Burns Lecture.
1. In his Burns Lecture on 22 November 1996, Ronald Dworkin described
this sort of rejection in principle as 'extraordinary', 'blunt', 'blanket', and
'crude'-in the case of euthanasia. He did not take the opportunity, afforded
then by my remarks, to say whether these epithets apply also to our law's rejec-
tion of slavery, torture, coerced confessions, etc.
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We are all going to be involved in this debate, this struggle for
power, this great collective deliberation, for the rest of our lifetimes.
We will need to keep our critical faculties all the way through. There
will be majority decisions by courts, legislatures, electorates, some-
times by wide margins labelled 'consensus'. But to resolve these
great issues of moral truth and judgment we each have standards by
which we, anyone, can critically assess and judge legislatures, Fuhrers,
courts. The 'right-thinking' people who call the tune in law schools,
media and courts may well be like the right-thinking people who de-
cided' for individual autonomy against social justice in Lochner v.
New York2 or for quality of life against radical human dignity in Buck
v. Bell3 ('three generations of imbeciles are enough', said Justice
Holmes to justify sterilising a mentally retarded girl). And, on the
other hand, perhaps the laws against homicide, so often re-enacted
and confirmed over the centuries, impose as Ronald Dworkin thinks
a 'serious, unjustified, unnecessary ... ,4 crippling, humiliating ... 2
devastating, odious form of tyranny, when applied to prevent phy-
sicians killing terminally ill patients. That's a thought we should cer-
tainly consider on its merits.
But if we are to keep our critical freedom we cannot accept that
'History has decided', or is deciding this issue; or has settled other is-
sues so that as a matter of principle and integrity this issue must now
be decided in a certain way.7 Conscience judges, not by the play of
2. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
3. 274 U.S. 200,207 (1927).
4. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 146 (1996).
5. Ronald Dworkin, When Can a Doctor Kill?, THE TIMES (London), Apr.
27, 1993, at 16.
6. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT
ABORTION, EUTHANASIA AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 217 (1993).
7. In his Bums Lecture, Dworkin advanced precisely such a claim, making
central to his address the contention that in Cruzan v. Missouri Department of
Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), the American people had resolved, or at least sup-
posed (with definitive effect), that patients and their doctors may lawfully, as a
matter of constitutional right, aim at death. This claim was doubly erroneous. If
Cruzan had indeed made such a decision, or supposition, it would now be open
to the Court and to the people to judge it a false step, an abandonment of the his-
toric and morally sound foundations of the law of murder, a mistaken decision
ripe for reform by overruling. But, secondly, it is historically and juridically crys-
tal clear that Cruzan neither decided, nor supposed, nor even entertained the
possibility that people and their doctors have a constitutional right to aim at
death. The dissenting Justices accurately state the core of the majority opinion in
the following terms: 'the Court, while tentatively accepting that there is some
degree of constitutionally protected liberty interest in avoiding unwanted medical
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judicial or any other majoritarian or elite power, opinion, will, but by
looking for reasons good as reasons. So I shall be considering the is-
sues as they arise for every contemporary community (including the
United States), and not as matters of American constitutional law as
such.
II
The opinion of Judge Reinhardt for eight judges of the Ninth
Circuit in Compassion in Dying v. Washington (March 1996) uses the
term 'euthanasia' in an almost uniquely eccentric way, as the unre-
quested putting to death of persons suffering from incurable and dis-
tressing disease.9 Almost all other English-speakers call that
non-voluntary euthanasia, and so shall I. I shall assume Ronald
Dworkin's agreement, since he defines euthanasia simply as
'deliberately killing a person out of kindness" 0-° not very serviceable
as a legal definition, but compatible with common usage and not with
the Ninth Circuit's.
The official Dutch definition of 'euthanasia' is precisely opposite
to the Ninth Circuit's, but equally eccentric: termination of life 'by
treatment, including life-sustaining medical treatment such as artificial nutrition
and hydration, affirms the decision of the Missouri Supreme Court'. Id. at 302
(Brennan, J., dissenting, j6ined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun) (emphasis
added). They add: 'Justice O'Connor's [concurring] opinion is less parsimonious.
She openly affirms that "the Court has often deemed state incursions into the
body repugnant to the interests protected by the Due Process Clause", that there
is a liberty interest in avoiding unwanted medical treatment, and that it encom-
passes the right to be free of "artificially delivered food and water".' Id. at 304
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Thus the interest presupposed by
the Court was simply the interest in refusing unwanted interventions on one's
body. The fact that some patients or doctors may foreseeably abuse or exploit
the protected liberty interest by making it the instrument of an aim (intent, pur-
pose, etc.) to bring about death in no way makes such motives a part of the con-
stitutionally protected interest. The easily foreseeable fact that defendants will
exploit their constitutionally protected liberty to testify, by aiming to deceive the
jury, does not make such an aim a part of the constitutionally protected liberty
right-as if that great liberty could be accurately understood as 'the right to lie',
and as if counsel, after hearing a client's unambiguous confession of guilt, would
nevertheless have the constitutional right to put that client on the stand precisely
in order to lie.
8. 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.), rev'd sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.
Ct. 2258 (1997).
9. See id. at 832 n.120.
10. DwoRKIN, supra note 6, at 3. Mysteriously, when he comes to the part of
the book dealing with euthanasia, he offers a new and highly eccentric definition
which greatly eases his task as an advocate: 'euthanasia in its various forms-
suicide, assisting suicide, or withholding medical treatment or life support-may
be [etc.] .... ' Id. at 213.
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someone other than the person concerned upon the request of the
latter."' Almost everyone in the English-speaking world calls that
'voluntary euthanasia', and so shall I.
We must have the odd Dutch definition firmly in mind when we
read that 2% of all deaths in the Netherlands in 1990 resulted from
'euthanasia'. 2 If we do, we will remember to read more deeply into
the figures. Then we will find that a further nearly 1% of all Dutch
deaths-over 1,000 further deaths-followed immediately the admin-
istering of a drug 'with the explicit purpose of hastening the end of
life without an explicit request of the patient'. These 1,000 cases are
not called euthanasia, in the eccentric Dutch sense; they are the only
euthanasia in Holland, in the eccentric Ninth Circuit sense. In the
more usual idiom which I am adopting they are of course cases of
non-voluntary euthanasia.
In his new book, Freedom's Law, Ronald Dworkin says: 'Some
critics worry about the practice in Holland, where doctors have given
lethal injections to unconscious or incompetent terminal patients who
had not explicitly asked to die'. 3 Indeed 'doctors have'. But in fact
about 40% of those 1,000 people officially known to have been killed
without their request were neither unconscious nor incompetent.
14
We might use the label 'involuntary euthanasia' for this sub-class of
non-voluntary euthanasia: killed while competent to request but not
requesting death. We still lack an accepted label for physicians' ter-
minating people's life against their request: perhaps
'contra-voluntary euthanasia'.
The definitions I have suggested so far leave one important mat-
ter unclear. I introduce it, again, by reference to Dutch experience,
though it is of universal significance. Euthanasia and assisting suicide
were exempted from criminal sanctions by a decision of the Dutch
11. John Keown, Euthanasia in the Netherlands: Sliding Down the Slippery
Slope?, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: ETHICAL, CLINICAL AND LEGAL PER-
SPECriVES 261, 270 (John Keown ed., 1995) (emphasis added).
12. See id. at 268.
13. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 144.
14. See Loes Pijnenborg et al., Life-Terminating Acts Without Explicit Re-
quest, 341 LANCET 1165, 1197 (1993); THE NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON
LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN DEATH Is SOUGHT: ASSISTED SUICIDE AND
EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT 134 n.31 (1994) [hereinafter TASK
FORCE]. Pijnenborg's study relates to a different series; the corresponding fig-
ures supplied by the official Committee state that 25% of those killed without
their request were stated by their doctors to be totally (14%) or partly (11%)
competent to request. See Keown, supra note 11, at 292 n.104.
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Supreme Court in 1984.15 Three months earlier, the Royal Dutch
Medical Association had set out criteria for permissible euthanasia,
later adopted in national medical 'Guidelines for Euthanasia'.16 In
the Medical Association's report no distinction was drawn between
'active' and 'passive'. 'All activities or non-activities with the purpose
to terminate a patient's life are defined as euthanasia'.'
This inclusion of 'non-activities', omissions, 'passive' conduct, is
entirely reasonable. Euthanasia, on any view, is an exception or pro-
posed exception to the law of homicide, more specifically the law of
murder. And you can unquestionably commit murder by omission.
Parents murder children sometimes with a pillow but sometimes by
starvation, omitting to feed them. To inherit the fortune, I omit to
give the diabetic child his insulin. To be free to marry his secretary,
Dr D. omits to switch his wife's life-support system back on after its
daily service break. The core concept in the law of murder, every-
where, is intention to cause death. Causation-starvation, dehydra-
tion, insulin shock-plus intention: murder by omission. Of course,
the accused must have had control over the deceased---care or an ac-
knowledged, fulfillable duty of care-otherwise there's no intention
but at most a wish.
In short, to make euthanasia lawful, the desired exception to the
law of murder needs to cover cases of omission with intent to termi-
nate life. The Dutch Guidelines take care to cover such cases.
But the official Dutch commentary on the 1990 statistics selects
for presentation only the cases of euthanasia by action. One has to
look to the underlying official figures to see all the many cases where
treatment was withdrawn or withheld with the primary or secondary
purpose of shortening life, as well as many cases in which pain medi-
cation was administered precisely with the intent to shorten life."
15. See John Keown, The Law and Practice of Euthanasia in The Netherlands,
108 LAw Q. REv. 51,51-57 (1992); Keown, supra note 14, at 261.
16. Promulgated jointly by the Royal Dutch Medical Association and the
National Association of Nurses. See Keown, supra note 11, at 264.
17. See Keown, supra note 11, at 271,290 (emphasis altered).
18. See Keown, supra note 11, at 268-73. The additional officially admitted
1,000 terminations without request included only those done by administering a
drug with that intention. The missing cases-which are euthanasia under the
Guidelines but carried out by omission-are grouped under two headings:
'Withdrawal or withholding of treatment partly with the purpose of shortening
life' (9,042 cases), and 'Withdrawal or withholding of treatment with the explicit
purpose [i.e., solely or primarily for the purpose] of terminating life' (5,508
cases)-a further 14,550 cases in all-about 9% of all deaths in Holland. See id.
at 270. (Of these additional deaths, the majority (60%) were non-voluntary
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When we sum up these official Dutch statistics for the fifth year
of their euthanasia regime, we find that in 26,350 cases, death was ac-
celerated by medical intervention intended wholly or partly to termi-
nate life. That is over 20% of all Dutch deaths. In the United States
that would be over 400,000 deaths. 9 Of these, well over half-59%
(15,528)-were without any explicit request. In the United States
that would be over 235,000 unrequested medically accelerated deaths
per annum.?
Before leaving words and definitions, I should say something
more about intention. The entire opinion of Judge Reinhardt for the
Ninth Circuit in Compassion in Dying relies upon a law school defi-
nition of intention as including not only what you intend but also
whatever you foresee as the certain or even likely2l outcome of your
conduct. So Judge Reinhardt derides the American Medical Asso-
ciation's insistence upon the distinction between giving pain killers
with intent to kill and giving them with intent to suppress pain.' He
euthanasia.) Of course, treatment is often withdrawn without any purpose of
terminating life, but knowing that death will result as a more or less inevitable
side-effect. The figures I have just given, where termination of life was a pur-
pose, represent only a minority (about 47%) of all the cases where treatment was
withdrawn and death followed. Another set of cases not noticed in the soothing
official commentary is those where pain- or symptom-relief was administered
with the explicit [i.e., primary] purpose of shortening life (a further 1,350 cases),
or partly with that purpose (another 6,750)-cases mostly of lethal, though not
instantly lethal injections. See id. Of these, 5,508 cases (68%) are to be added to
the 1,000 cases Dworkin presumably had in mind when he said that 'doctors have
given lethal injections to unconscious or incompetent terminal patients who had
not explicitly asked to die'.
19. Even if one excludes all the cases where terminating life was not the doc-
tor's primary intention, it remains true that nearly 1 death in 12 is accelerated
precisely and explicitly with the intent to terminate life -in the United States
that would be over 160,000 deaths each year, over 80,000 of them being without
explicit request. In sum, using my definition of euthanasia, the only definition
which really fits with the surrounding law of murder, there would be at a mini-
mum about 160,000 and more realistically over 400,000 cases in the United States
of euthanasia-deaths caused by decisions and courses of conduct intended to
bring it about. Less than half of these would be voluntary and the rest, the ma-
jority, would be non-voluntary. And more than a third of these cases of
non-voluntary euthanasia would doubtless be the killing of patients who were at
that time competent to make an explicit request but did not do so.
20. Of course, these extrapolations to the United States are debatable. Hol-
land suffered the horrors of Nazi invasion and purges, has a more effective and
universally available healthcare system, and is relatively free from racial and un-
derclass poverty. On the other hand, it has doubtless been affected more deeply
than the United States by atheism and unbelief, and so by cynicism and despair.
21. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.), cert.
granted sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1996).
22. See id. at 823-24 & n.94. The distinction is firmly and ably defended by (i)
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declares that doctors who respect a patient's decision to forgo
life-sustaining treatment intend to hasten their patient's death.' And
that the laws authorising people to refuse treatment are simply laws
for authorising suicide. In a delirium of rhetoric, he even suggests
that laws for preventing suicide have 'an aim' of prolonging a dying
person's suffering. And so on and on-this is the key to the whole
opinion.
The word 'intention' can indeed be given a special extended
meaning, including foreseen likely effects, which does not do much
harm in the law of torts, but has had to be carefully expelled from the
law of murder by a long course of decisions and enactment.24 The ex-
tended meaning was always a legal fiction. Intention is a reality, not
merely a word. That's why it is synonymous, in its non-fictitious
sense, with many other words and phrases: 'with the aim of, 'with a
purpose of, 'trying to', 'in order to', 'with a view to', or plain 'to' (as
in 'He came to Loyola to give a lecture' or 'She gave the morphine to
kill the patient to let the children claim under the expiring insurance
policy'). You intend your end (aim, purpose, sought-after outcome)
and your chosen means. Consequences which you foresee, even as
certainties, are not intended unless they are one of your ends or your
means. I foresee jetlag flying the Atlantic, the hangover after the
party, the fading of drapes in bright sunlight, the annoyance of people
who hear my stuttering, the death of my own troops in the assault I
have ordered. I intend none of those consequences, however inevi-
table.
No less erroneously and arbitrarily than the Ninth Circuit, the
Second Circuit in Quill v. Vacco' wholly misrepresents both the in-
tention of the legislative guarantees of the right to refuse medical
treatment m, and the type of intentions for the sake of which such
Judge Kleinfeld, dissenting in Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 858; and (ii) the
Walton Committee: Report of the House of Lords Select Committee on Medical
Ethics, HL Paper 21-I of 1993-94 (31 January 1994), paras. 242-44, reproduced in
EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: ETHICAL, CLINICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES
103-04 (John Keown ed., 1995). And see now the firm and clear statements of
the Court in Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997), especially the quotations from
United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403-406 (1980) and from Judge Kleinfeld's
judgment.
23. See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 822.
24. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 513 (1979); John Finnis, Inten-
tion and Side-Effects, in LIABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN LAW AND
MoRALS 32-64 (Frey & Morris eds., 1991).
25. 80 F.3d 716 (1996).
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legislation was enacted: not the intention of hastening or determin-
ing the time of my death but the intention to be free from unwanted
burdens and interventions on my body, even if my death is a foresee-
able consequence. The legislature of course foresaw that one conse-
quence of its enactment would be that some people would use-
abuse-this right by exercising it with intent to hasten death. But as a
legislative declaration makes clear,2 that was not part of the legisla-
ture's intent-no more than we intend the guilty to escape when we
grant due process of law, or intend lawyers to conspire to lie when we
grant an attorney-client privilege.
So much for words. If we are to tell what is being said, we need
not only definitions but also propositions. We must not try to make
do-or do anything-with non-propositional catchphrases such as
'sanctity of life', 'death with dignity', or 'right to die'.
Take the last, 'the right to die'. Where is the proposition specify-
ing who has the right, to what acts, by which persons? Is it the right
of terminally ill patients? (And what is terminal illness?) Or only of
those who are suffering? (And what sort and degree of sufferings?)
Or of all who are suffering whether or not their illness is terminal? Is
it a right only to be assisted in killing oneself, as created in the sus-
pended Oregon law of 1995? Or also that others be permitted (or
perhaps under a duty) to kill me? (When I cannot do so myself? Or
also when I choose?).n
Here in the United States the debate is currently fixated on as-
sisting in suicide. But this is only a whistle stop.' The Ninth Circuit's
26. See Health Care Agents and Proxies Act, N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §
2989(3) (McKinney 1993); Quill, 80 F.3d at 734 n.7.
27. The Dutch Supreme Court's 1984 decision exempted from criminal sanc-
tion not only euthanasia but also assisting in suicide, the subject of a different
provision of the Dutch Penal Code. But assisted suicide is a minority pursuit in
Holland. Against the 26,000 cases of euthanasia, only about 400 cases of assisted
suicide are reported.
28. Sometimes this way station is passed through within the confines of a
single statute. Thus in the Northern Territory of Australia, the world's first and
(for a brief period) only operative legislative enactment in the field, the Rights of
the Terminally Ill Act 1995, is presented to the public as about assistance in kill-
ing oneself, and has a central provision which seems to mean precisely that:
4. A patient who, in the course of a terminal illness, is experiencing
pain, suffering and/or distress to an extent unacceptable to the patient,
may request the patient's medical practitioner to assist the patient to
terminate the patient's life.
Rights of the Terminally I Act 1995 (N. Terr. Austl.) § 4. But the Act's defini-
tion of 'assist' gives, at the very end of the list, 'and the administration of a sub-
stance to the patient'. Id. § 2. So this is a euthanasia law under colour of a law
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opinion, behind its protective refusal to identify even in principle
what class of people has the constitutional right it declares, made it
quite clear that the court sees no relevant distinctions short of the
distinction between 'voluntary and involuntary' (non-voluntary)
termination of life.29 And even that distinction is immediately re-
vealed to be fuzzy: the footnote warns that the judges 'do not inti-
mate any view' of non-voluntary or involuntary euthanasia, and that
if 'a duly appointed surrogate decision maker' decides to terminate
the life of a non-competent patient, that counts as 'voluntary' eutha-
nasia.3
III
People say everyone has a right to autonomy-that as an Ameri-
can, one has 'the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life'-the
words in Planned Parenthood v. Casey31 relied upon by the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Compassion in Dying2 and quoted approvingly in Ronald
Dworkin's new book.33 But healthy Americans who demand assis-
tance in suicide, or actual euthanasia at the hands of medical person-
nel, will find themselves being told by our reformers that, well, after
all the right belongs not to those with an autonomy interest in defin-
ing their own concept of existence and so forth, but to people whose
lives are no longer worth living-and, that means whose lives are no
longer worth living in the opinion of a court, or medical practitioners,
in the context of legislative criteria adopted by courts or legislatures
from time to time. Even when you fall seriously ill, or become clini-
cally depressed, you will find (if the reformers are to be believed)
that your right to autonomy does not give you the right to be assisted
in suicide unless you are ill enough or suffering enough, or depressed
severely and incurably enough-in each case 'enough' in the view of
somebody else, other people. And this of course is no surprise. For
what you are proposing is not a private act, but precisely an act in
which you seek assistance from someone else, or which you are ask-
ing someone else to carry out, sharing your intent to destroy your
about assisting suicide.
29. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 832 (9th Cir.), cert
granted sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1996).
30. Id. at 832 n.120.
31. 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
32. 79 F.3d at 813.
33. See DwoRKiN, supra note 4, at 144.
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personal life. It is no more a private act than a duel or an agreement
to sell myself into slavery.
So the bottom line issue becomes clearer. When should we allow
some people to sit in judgment on the life of another human person,
to judge that person's life worthless, and so to authorise themselves
or others to carry out that person's request for death? And then, if
such judgments about the worthlessness of a person's life are deci-
sive, why not also when the judgment about insufficient or negative
quality of life is the same but the request for help to terminate life
cannot be made? Or has not been made?
Notice: the issue is not whether physicians can reasonably make
the more limited assessment necessary to judge further treatment
futile, or excessively burdensome, or not rewarding enough to be
worth the costs in suffering, money, labour, or use of other resources.
Those are difficult, inherently uncertain judgments. But they are in
any case made, routinely, in countless ways in countless cases. They
remain focused upon the treatment and the burdens and benefits, and
fall short of the global assessment of a person's whole existence
needed to warrant a decision focused precisely on terminating that
existence-to undertake a course of conduct with the intent to kill (or
assist in the killing of) that person, to destroy or assist-in the deliber-
ate destruction of his or her very being so far as is humanly possible.
IV
We should not try to estimate the impact of changing the law by
looking at its new permission while holding steady and unchanged
everything else in the picture. Ronald Dworkin has given the British
public good advice: When considering the impact of introducing a
justiciable Bill of Rights, do not for a moment assume that it will be
interpreted and enforced by lawyers and judges with today's atti-
tudes. A whole new breed of lawyers and law teachers and judges will
rapidly come into existence to give effect to the new regime. t
34. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 31 (1985). H. L. A.
Hart, a passionate liberal reformer, never ceased to support the legislation of
1967 which legalised so-called therapeutic abortion in Britain. But in the 1970s
he noted that its effects had been greatly underestimated by those who brought
about the change. What had been envisaged by many as simply a permission,
recognising an area of liberty in place of prohibition, had proved to be the intro-
duction of a vast structure of new relationships, institutions, funding, professional
obligations, and so forth, involving changes in the ethics, practices, and disposi-
tions of doctors, midwives, social workers, psychiatrists, and people at large. See
H. L. A. Hart, Abortion Law Reform: The English Experience, 8 MELB. U. L.
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So do not think of the euthanasia law being administered by to-
day's medical practitioners and nurses and hospital administrators,
whose codes of ethics exclude killing as a treatment and management
option. If the law of murder were changed in the way proposed, and
especially if it were changed by decision of the Supreme Court declar-
ing what is every American's right as part of the very meaning of lib-
erty, the ethics of all those professions and classes would-and would
be bound to-change. The change would be very rapid, hastened
along by the not too gentle spur of the law of torts.
Don't be distracted here by conscience clauses. The question is
not about the right of the few orthodox Catholics and Jews and other
mavericks to opt out. It is about the bulk of ordinary decent profes-
sionals3 5 equipped with new 'treatment options' which would greatly
simplify the management of difficult cases, by the elimination of the
human being causing the trouble.
Our doctors have always had the power to kill us. And to dis-
guise their deed. This time last year I watched my father die of can-
cer. The doctor who gave him morphine towards the end had the
power to decide to terminate his life under the guise of deciding what
would quell his pain. In many, many situations, nothing prevents the
doctor deciding to kill save an ethic which simply excludes that op-
tion-the ethic derided by the Ninth Circuit for insisting upon the
very same difference as the law of murder: between intending to kill
and accepting death as a side-effect (possibly welcome but still unin-
tended) of something done with no such intent. Now change the law
and the professional ethic. Killing with intent becomes a routine
management option. Oh yes, there are restrictions, guidelines, pa-
perwork. Well meant. Not utterly irrelevant. But as nothing com-
pared with our doctors' change in heart, professional formation and
conscience.
So our doctors would enter our sickrooms as men and women
trained to be willing to kill on the occasions of their choosing, guided
we trust by new professional and legal standards which shift to and
fro searching for the bright line lost with the majoritarian judicial or
REv. 388,408-09 (1972).
35. Like, for example, all who massively opposed the introduction of Great
Britain's Abortion Act 1967 as a violation of the profession's age-old ethics,
whose Medical Defence Union told them in 1968 that changing the criminal law
entailed changing their civil law duties of care in tort, and who within a few years
became massively opposed to any reform that might slightly reduce the treatment
options that had become available to them. See JOHN KEOWN, ABORTION,
DocroRs AND THE LAW: SOME ASPECrS OF THE LEGAL REGULATION OF
ABORTION IN ENGLAND FROM 1803-1982 84,84-109 (1988).
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legislative overthrow of the line between intending to kill and intend-
ing to heal, treat, alleviate, palliate ....
A new zone of silence. Can I safely speak to my physician about
the full extent of my sufferings, about my fears, about my occasional
or regular wish to be free from my burdens? Will my words be heard
as a plea to be killed? As a tacit permission? And why does my
physician need my permission, my request? The Dutch guidelines,
insisted upon in court pronouncements, and described in the Dutch
press and literature with robotic, mantra-like regularity as 'strict' and
'precise', demand that euthanasia be preceded by an explicit request.
But within five years most Dutch medical killings are without any
explicit request whatever. And though reporting is required by the
guidelines, and non-reporting is a criminal offense, 87% are not re-
ported. In a famously law-abiding country.
Another zone of fearful silence. Outside the door are the rela-
tives. What will they be telling the doctor about my condition and
my wishes? What is it prudent to tell them about my suffering, my
depression, my wishes? Are they interpreting my state of mind just
as I would wish? Are their interests in line with mine? Many people
will find that their nearest and dearest are less and less near, and less
and less dear.36
Dutch doctors give the official (anonymous) enquiries two main
reasons why they almost always violate the Guidelines and the crimi-
nal law by falsifying the death certificate and reporting that death
was from 'natural causes'. One is to avoid the fuss of legal investiga-
tion. The other, almost equally strong, is the desire to protect rela-
tives from official inquiry.'
Ronald Dworkin's new book responds to such concerns. Even
now, he says, 'doctors sometimes deliberately give dying patients
large enough doses of pain-killing drugs to kill them'." He ignores
the question of their intent in doing so, and says that this is a 'covert
36. See Roger Scruton, Not Mighty But Mundane, The Times (London), May
30, 1996, at 41, a sympathetic review of BERT KEIZER, DANCING WITH MR D
(1996), by a sensitive and philosophically inclined ex-Catholic Dutch euthanasiast
doctor who recounts his experiences in killing his patients, the astonishing ease
with which one gets and uses this licence to kill, the rapid informality of the ac-
tual killing (a speed and informality necessary to maintain the sense that this is a
medical event), and the frequently blas6 attitude of the relatives. In Scruton's
final words: '[A]s atheism, cynicism and the practice of euthanasia spread, your
nearest and dearest will be less and less near, and less and less dear'. Scruton, at
41.
37. See Keown, supra note 11, at 281.
38. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 145.
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decision much more open to abuse than a scheme of voluntary
euthanasia would be'.3 He neglects to note that, whatever the
'scheme of voluntary euthanasia would be', the power and opportu-
nity of doctors to administer lethal doses of pain-killers would remain
absolutely unfettered. But that same power and opportunity will be
in the hands of a 'new breed of doctors' (like Dworkin's projected
'new breed' of lawyers and judges for Britain), doctors directed to re-
gard intentional killing as a therapeutic option, something good doc-
tors quite often do. And now the 'covert decision' to use lethal doses
of pain-killers will be a readily available end-run around the law's
paperwork requirements for legal voluntary euthanasia-an end-run
for those doctors who don't wish to use the alternative end-run em-
ployed by Dutch doctors in 7 out of 8 cases of plain euthanasia-
ignore the paperwork. Either way: avoid fuss. Don't involve the
relatives in tiresome legal process.'
In his evidence before the Walton Committee (the British Par-
liamentary Committee on euthanasia in 1993), Dworkin was asked
again and again about these problems. His answers can be fairly
summarised in one quotation. This sort of bad consequence of legali-
sation-
is not an argument for caution, because it would be wrong
to harm a lot of people [by keeping the present law against
euthanasia] just because we feel that in some instance a
decision might be made on the wrong basis. Those in
charge of these decisions, and the doctors would be to the
frontline, would simply have to be very careful to observe
the kinds of conditions that the model Uniform Statute on
Living Wills ... directs doctors to attend to.
41
But of course, doctors would simply not 'have to', and the
Committee unanimously rejected his reassurances.
His response in his new book is equally unconvincing: 'states
plainly have the power to guard against requests influenced by guilt,
depression, poor care, or economic worries'. 42 Nearly everyone who
39. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 145.
40. Most of the non-reporting Dutch doctors gave two reasons for violating
their clear legal duty to report: avoid the fuss of legal investigation; protect the
relatives from judicial inquiry. See Keown, supra note 11, at 281.
41. Report of the House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics, HL
Paper 91-vii of 1992-93 (29 June 1993) 162, para. 452.
42. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 144.
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has thought seriously about this has concluded that the power is
practically empty.
Be that as it may, it is very important to see what's going on
here. Suppose for a moment that there is a right (moral or constitu-
tional) to choose when to die, i.e., to choose precisely to hasten one's
death. Even more evidently there is a right to choose not to be killed.
The question is which legal framework will take those rights most se-
riously. That is a largely empirical question. It is a question which
Dworkin accepts, but has wholly failed to answer plausibly. Here, at
the nub of the debate, we are not dealing with a legal theorist's vision
of what our constitution requires as a matter of integrity, or with a
Herculean grasp of the principles of an entire legal system and its his-
tory. We are all dealing with a question on which ordinary folk have
as good a grasp as anyone: In the new world of medical law and eth-
ics, what conceivable legislative pronouncements, elegant preambles,
government pamphlets, elaboration of hospital paperwork, physician
reporting, official enquiries and all that, could remove or even ap-
preciably diminish the patient's subjection to the pressure of the
thought that my being killed is what my relatives expect of me and is
in any case the decent thing to do, even though I utterly fear it and
perhaps perceive it as the uttermost and ultimate indignity, an odi-
ous, devastating subjection to the needs and will of others? And
likewise with the other sources of tyranny, the new power, opportu-
nity, and ethic of doctors, and the real and novel power of the rela-
tives.
At this point in his new book Dworkin terminates his brief re-
sponse to such concerns. 'These slippery-slope arguments', he de-
clares, 'are very weak ones; they seem only disguises for the deeper
convictions that actually move most opponents of all euthanasia'.43
To represent these convictions of most people who oppose euthanasia
he takes care to select a Catholic priest who links euthanasia with
contraception! But it is my colleague Ronald Dworkin's own assess-
ment of those effects and implications that is truly 'very weak'. The
Walton Committee of thirteen members included only one Catholic,
and a spread of liberal and secular opinion-medical, legal, philo-
sophical-representative of worldly, secular British society. They
heard him, read his book, took a mountain of other evidence, visited
Holland for discussions with the Dutch medical and legal authorities.
They unanimously recommended against changing the law defining
43. Id at 145.
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murder or assisted suicide. They judged unanimously that 'any
change' in the prohibition of intentional killing is to be rejected be-
cause it 'would have such serious and widespread repercussions'."
'[W]e do not think it possible to set secure limits on voluntary eutha-
nasia ... . [I]t would not be possible to frame adequate safeguards
against non-voluntary euthanasia if voluntary euthanasia were to be
legalized'.4 ' And so on, to the conclusion that 'any decriminalisation
of voluntary euthanasia would give rise to more, and more grave,
problems than those it sought to address'.'
The insinuation that most of those who state such deeply in-
formed judgments are disguising their real convictions is even more
vividly refuted by the 1994 report of the New York State Task Force
on Life and the Law, entitled When Death is Sought: Assisted Suicide
and Euthanasia in the Medical Context.' If you want a single, up to
date and American work as a basis for your reflections on the whole
question, this is the one. The 24 members of the Task Force, set up
in 1984 by Governor Mario Cuomo, were perhaps even more repre-
sentative, secular, liberal, than the Walton Committee. Some of
them think suicide and euthanasia morally acceptable in conscience. 4
After considering a mass of evidence (including Ronald Dworkin's
work, to which they carefully reply),49 with the aid of consultants at
44. Report of the House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics, HL
Paper 21-1 of 1993-94 (31 January 1994), para. 237. Excerpts reproduced in Ke-
own, supra note 11, at 102.
45. Report of the House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics, HL
Paper 21-I of 1993-94 (31 January 1994), para. 238. Excerpts reproduced in Ke-
own, supra note 11, at 103.
46. Report of the House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics, HL
Paper 21-I of 1993-94 (31 January 1994), para. 238. Excerpts reproduced in Ke-
own, supra note 11, at 103.
47. See TASK FORCE, supra note 13.
48. See id- at xii-xiii, 119-20.
49. See id. at 74 n.112:
Advocates of legalized assisted suicide or euthanasia often fail to
engage in [the] crucial balancing process. For example, Ronald
Dworkin suggests that, because "[tjhere are dangers both in legalizing
and refusing to legalize" euthanasia, society has an obligation to carve
out a middle ground. See R. Dworkin, Life's Dominion 198 (New
York: Knopf, 1993) ("[O]nce we understand that legalizing no
euthanasia is itself harmful to many people ... we realize that doing
our best to draw and maintain a defensible line ... is better than
abandoning those people altogether".). Dworkin's argument loses
much of its force once it is recognized that the number of people
genuinely harmed by laws prohibiting euthanasia or assisted suicide is
extremely small, and that legalizing euthanasia or assisted suicide for
the sake of these few-whatever safeguards are written into the law-
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least one of whom is strongly pro-euthanasia, they 'unanimously
concluded that legalizing assisted suicide and euthanasia would pose
profound risks to many patients', especially 'those who are poor, eld-
erly, members of a minority group, or without access to good medical
care .... The clinical safeguards that have been proposed to prevent
abuse and errors would not be realized in many cases'. ° These and
their other reasons for unanimously recommending that there be no
change in the law forbidding euthanasia and assistance in suicide are
carefully argued with full documentation over about 200 pages.
The Task Force took at face value the Dutch figures for
'euthanasia' in 1990 as given in the soothing and misleading official
commentary, overlooking the overwhelmingly greater numbers re-
vealed in the Tables behind that commentary.5 But even the mas-
saged Dutch figures, extrapolated to the United States (36,000 cases
of voluntary euthanasia and 16,000 non-voluntary per annum), were
judged by the members of the Task Force to be an 'unacceptable'
risk, a risk of abuse which, they added, 'is neither speculative nor dis-
tant, but an inevitable byproduct of the transition from policy to
practice in the diverse circumstances in which the practices would be
employed'. 2
The bottom line: the secular, highly experienced and sophisti-
cated members of the Walton Committee and the New York Task
Force judge that if euthanasia were legalised at all, the right not to be
killed would be catastrophically nullified for very many more people
than the few whose supposed right to die is compromised by present
law. The Ninth and Second Cir~uits' countervailing judgment, by
comparison, seems sophistical, naive and careless.
would endanger the lives of a far larger group of individuals, who
might avail themselves of these options as a result of depression,
coercion, or untreated pain.
See id. Dworkin's argument loses the rest of its force when one notices that he
has entirely neglected to offer any account of a 'defensible line' that might be
drawn and maintained. He suggests that if he were to offer a 'detailed legal
scheme' it would include rules for deciding 'when doctors may hasten the death
[soft words!] ... of unconscious patients who cannot make' the choice to die.
DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 216. For the rest he contents himself with attacking
the 'tyranny' of the existing law-'the jackboots of the criminal law'. Id. at 15.
50. TASK FORCE, supra note 47, at xiii; see also id. at 120.
51. See supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
52. TASK FORCE, supra note 47, at 134.
1138
BURNS LECTURE
V
As the fraud lawyers say, Follow the money. Who can doubt that
if assisted suicide is introduced by judicial fiat, it will be followed if
not accompanied by voluntary euthanasia, and that the subsequent,
inexorable course of litigation (whose outcome seems to be forecast
in the Ninth Circuit's footnote) 3 to establish that these autonomy
rights must be exercisable for and on behalf of the incompetent
would be litigation substantially funded by healthcare financial inter-
ests? Who can doubt that meanwhile, in the words of the New York
Task Force,
Limits on hospital reimbursement based on length of stay
and diagnostic group, falling hospital revenues, and the
social need to allocate health dollars may all influence
physicians' decisions at the bedside ... . Under any new
system of health care delivery, as at present, it will be far
less costly to give a lethal injection than to care for a patient
throughout the dying process.'
No one's pain, delirium, or other physical distress is untreatable.5 In
a tiny proportion of cases the treatment might have to extend to
keeping the patient unconscious.56 But the care-providers may well
have an objection to that: the cost of care.
VI
And we should be looking out for the will to power. Any per-
mission of euthanasia, voluntary or involuntary, will obviously be a
huge accession of power to physicians and healthcare personnel.
Dutch doctors not only regularly and with effective impunity kill
non-consenting patients. With equal freedom they refuse thousands
of requests for euthanasia. Patients are radically dependent and, in
53. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 832 n.120. (9th
Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1996).
54. TASK FORCE, supra note 47, at 123.
55. My Oxford colleague, Dr Robert Twycross (not a Catholic), who has
treated thousands of patients dying of cancer over the past 20 years, gives reasons
for thinking that the proportion of such cases where mastery of pain is difficult
for skillful practitioners is of the order of 1%, and the proportion where nothing
less than complete sedation will suffice is much less than 1%. See Robert G.
Twycross, Where There Is Hope, There Is Life: A View From the Hospice, in
EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: ETHICAL, CLINICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 141,
141, 147-49, 165-66 (John Keown ed. 1995).
56. See id. at 165-66.
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the Task Force's words, 'generally do what their doctors recom-
mend.'s As they also say:
Physicians who determine that a patient is a suitable
candidate for assisted suicide or euthanasia may be far less
inclined to present treatment alternatives, especially if the
treatment requires intensive efforts by health care
professionals. 8
And much more in the same vein, persuasively spelt out and docu-
mented by the Task Force.
The Task Force speaks on the basis of wide, hands-on medical
and other relevant practical experience. From my quite different
position let me just suggest another possible relevance of the will to
power. Ronald Dworkin's theory of the right to euthanasia-a the-
ory in which there is indeed something to admire, especially his ac-
count of 'critical interests' and his rejection of scepticism---is a the-
ory driven by a conception that it is reasonable (and, he insinuates,
right) to regard one's life as a narrative of which one is the author, so
that when one ceases to be in command of the plot one's remaining
life-denounced as mere biological life-is valueless if not indeed
'indecent' and contemptible. And here he quotes with evident ap-
proval passages in which Nietzsche fiercely attacks those who do not
choose to die 'when it is no longer possible to live proudly'.0 What-
ever Dworkin's own views, there is much to reflect upon herea-
bouts-not least Nietzsche's passionate contempt for the weak, and
for compassion with them. Nietzsche's conception of morality as a
kind of aesthetics-the aesthetics of a self-created life, indeed a self-
narrated life, and in that way a life of noble, authorial power-deeply
and pervasively misunderstands morality and thus the very founda-
tions of human rights. A theme I cannot pursue here.
VII
The Ninth Circuit ransacks the language to describe the
'unrelieved misery or torture' from which its decision will rescue
people. The judgment's last words are 'painful, protracted, and ago-
nizing deaths'." But as Dr Peter Admiraal, leading Dutch exponent
57. TASK FORCE, supra note 47, at 122.
58. d. at 124.
59. See DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 201-07.
60. See DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 212.
61. Compassion in Dying v.Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 814, 839 (9th Cir.), cert.
granted sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1996).
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and practitioner of euthanasia, said in the mid-1980s, pain is never a
legitimate reason for euthanasia because methods exist to relieve it,62
indeed in most cases it can be adequately controlled without adverse
effect on the patient's normal functioning.' An expert committee of
the World Health Organisation concluded in 1990: 'now that a prac-
ticable alternative to death in pain exists, there should be concen-
trated efforts to implement programs of palliative care, rather than
yielding to pressure for legal euthanasia'. ' Though Dworkin toys
with talk of 'terrible pain' 5 and 'prolonged agony'," his primary ar-
gument for wanting legalisation of euthanasia lies elsewhere, so far as
I can see-in the view that it is reasonable to have a
quasi-Nietzschean, aesthetic hatred of dependence and loathing for
the spectacle of (say) Sunny von Bulow, wholly unconscious for years
but visited daily by her hairdresser. 'Really obscene' he told the Wal-
ton Committee.'
It is indeed hard for people like judges, professors, classical
scholars, and so forth-used to mastery, achievement, and control-
to accept the prospect of becoming or being subject to great depriva-
tion and more or less complete dependence. They-we-are under-
standably but misguidedly tempted to view such a state as spoiling
their 'narrative'. The view is radically mistaken: the narrative of
which they can (where they rightly can) be proud is a narrative which
ends when their actual ability to carry out choices ends. Beyond that
point, as (in one's earliest years) before it, there is life which is real,
human, and personal, but without a story of which to be proud or
ashamed. An utterly common human condition. Aesthetic objec-
tions to being reduced to this equality of dependence and powerless-
ness are, I suggest, no adequate basis for imposing on the many the
grave injustices-the terror of being put to death and the reality of
coerced and unrequested extinction-inherent in any working regime
of euthanasia.
62. See Twycross supra note 55, at 141.
63. See Pieter V. Admiraal, Justifiable Euthanasia, 3 ISSUES IN LAW & MED.
361,362 (1988).
64. World Health Organization, Cancer Pain Relief and Palliative Care
(1986). In the background is the WHO's breakthrough Method for Relief of
Cancer Pain. See id. at 43-70.
65. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 209.
66. Ronald Dworkin, Sex, Death, and the Courts, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Aug. 8,
1996, at 44, 47.
67. Report of the House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics, HL
Paper 91-vii of 1992-93, 162 (29 June 1993). See also DWORKIN, supra note 6, at
210.
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VIII
What I have said about pain is one explanation why I have said
so little about the realities of suffering which tempt people to commit
suicide or seek assistance in doing so or demand that doctors be le-
gally authorised to kill them. Another reason is this. For every har-
rowing case you can depict or report which would fall within any le-
galisation of euthanasia seriously defended in public debate today,
there can be found dozens of cases quite comparably harrowing
which fall on the other side of any such line. Read the euthanasiast,
confused, but (it seems) honest Dr Lonny Shavelson's A Chosen
Death s Of the half-dozen harrowing cases he describes, only one or
two would fall within any plausible euthanasia campaigner's script
(and one of those, an AIDS patient who kept moving his 'line in the
sand', dies naturally). Read accounts of the experience of long-time
physicians in hospices for the dying. 9
The hard cases, the real sufferings of real people, are not to be
shuffled away in our deliberations about euthanasia. We need to
ponder them, not least to ask ourselves what we should be doing
about pain and depression and other relievable sources of misery.
But we also should look for the line, any line seriously proposed, and
ask the line-drawers what sense they can make of distinguishing be-
tween the cases on each side of it-in matters so important as auton-
omy, oppression, and existence itself.
In his latest publication on euthanasia, Dworkin describes the
right he contends for as 'the basic right of citizens to decide for them-
selves whether to die at once or after prolonged agony'.70 But 'once'
what? Decide to die when? The great majority of people who re-
quest euthanasia in hospices change their minds and come to value
their last months or weeks of illness, severe though this often is. Few
of those who are dying of AIDS request euthanasia; most of the
many suicides of AIDS patients are by rather healthy people fairly
soon after being told of their prognosis." Those who hang on very of-
ten find that their hope is eventually transferred from living on to
dying well-albeit in extremities of disfigurement and debility-
dying affirmed and not abandoned by their relatives or friends.
These many, many people, having left behind the falsely exclusive
68. LONNY SHAVELSON, A CHOSEN DEATH: THE DYING CONFRONT
AssIsTED SUICIDE (1995).
69. See, e.g., Twycross, supra note 55, at 141-68.
70. Dworkin, supra note 66, at 47 (emphasis added).
71. See Twycross, supra note 55, at 152-54.
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and dominating ethic or aesthetic of control, mastery, and achieve-
ment, have found a deeper, more humble but more human under-
standing of the worth of simply being, with what remains of what one
was given.
Ix
Last but by no means least, we should wish to remain uncor-
rupted by the terrible euthanasiast confusion between being in an
undignified situation or condition and lacking human dignity. Mind-
ful of the Nazi horror, most American and English euthanasiasts
have not yet turned their talent for rhetorically demeaning the dying
or the comatose-'vegetables', and so forth-to doing the same for
the mentally handicapped. What reason of principle have they for
this abstention?
The deepest mistakes in Ronald Dworkin's approach to eutha-
nasia are encapsulated in the favour which Life's Dominion suggests
he has for the view that nurses who care for the permanently coma-
tose, and who believe that they are doing it for a comatose person,
are in fact caring only for a 'vegetating body with ... the ultimate in-
sult: the conviction that they do it for him'7 2 He does not explain
how it could be reasonable to think that a body supposed to be
merely vegetative and no longer personal could be insulted by re-
spectful and loving care. And he does not defend the incoherent per-
son-body dualism73 involved in declaring the nurses erroneous in their
belief that they are acting for a person, albeit one in the extremities
of illness .and disability. Like the nurses, and the whole tradition of
respecting radical human equality, I think we should judge, and act
on the basis, that: Persons keep their radical dignity until death-all
the way through.
As the Walton Committee, immediately after setting out
Dworkin's thesis, expressed the essential point: the 'prohibition of
intentional killing ... is the cornerstone of law and social relation-
ships. It protects each one of us impartially, embodying the belief
that all are equal'.74 The Committee had seen through the arguments
72. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 212.
73. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, ET AL., NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, MORALITY AND
REALISM 304-09 (1987); John Finnis, A Philosophical Case Against Euthanasia,
in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: ETHICAL, CLINICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 32
(John Keown ed. 1995).
74. Report of the House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics, HL
Paper 21-I of 1993-94 (31 January 1994) paras. 236-37. Excerpts reproduced in
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from autonomy and pluralism: unless doctors are to be permitted to
kill anyone and everyone who makes a 'stable and competent' re-
quest for death, they are going to have to proceed on a classification
of lives as 'worth living' or 'not worth living'. Benign as its present
authors and promoters doubtless generally are, such a classification
would create in our society a new structure of radical inequality, with
implications of the most sinister kind.75
Keown, supra note 11, at 102.
236. [W]e gave much thought too to Professor Dworkin's opinion
that, for those without religious belief, the individual is best able to
decide what manner of death is fitting to the life which has been lived.
237. Ultimately, however, we do not believe that these arguments are
sufficient reason to weaken society's prohibition of intentional killing.
See id. No other person is distinguished by name in the Committee's long report.
75. These implications are readily discerned by members of disfavoured and
vulnerable groups. I have in my files three reports to the legislative committee
responsible for Aboriginal affairs in the legislature of the Northern Territory of
Australia, dated 28 June, 9 July, and 23 July 1996, by Mr Chips Mackinolty, the
consultant commissioned by the Northern Territory Government to explain to
Aboriginal communities throughout the Northern Territory of Australia the
meaning, limits, and benefits of the Territory's euthanasia statute. See supra note
28. Despite his support for the principles of the statute, Mr Mackinolty's experi-
ence of the fear and opposition of the Aboriginal communities-opposition
which grew rather than diminished as they heard his explanations-has led him
to advise the Northern Territory legislature to repeal the statute.
The level of fear of and hostility to the legislation is far more
widespread than originally envisaged .... While it was expected that
Aboriginal people out bush would be opposed and would be highly
unlikely to avail themselves of the Act, opposition to its existence
must be viewed as near universal .... One central Australian
community, after hearing out some of the education program, became
extremely angry at the legislation's existence. ('[I]t might be all right
for that man in Darwin to kill his mother, but we don't do that here!'),
and asked us to leave .... It has been expressed to us by a number of
individuals that euthanasia is seen by some as a further method of
genocide of Aboriginal people ... . Conversely, there has been
genuine interest from health workers and community leaders in
finding out exactly what is in the legislation (albeit with a sense of
trying to work out what these crazy whitefellas are up to now!) ....
As expected there has been considerable interest in Palliative Care,
which has been seen by all as 'the Aboriginal way'.
Report by Chips Mackinolty to the Northern Territory of Australia Legislative
Committee for Aboriginal Affairs (June 28, 1996) (on file with author).
Going on from the previous report, I would reiterate in the strongest
possible terms the comments made previously with regard to
Aboriginal attitudes to the legislation and the damage it is causing
Territory Health Services' reputation and standing out bush.
Report by Chips Mackinolty to the Northern Territory of Australia Legislative
Committee for Aboriginal Affairs (July 9, 1996) (on file with author).
I would love to report some sort of epiphany on the road to the ROTI
[euthanasia] legislation, but it just hasn't happened. If anything I feel
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Dworkin now argues that there must be no 'official orthodoxy'
about what makes human life of value. He says that 'no one can treat
[the values in question] as trivial enough to accept other people's or-
ders about what they mean''76 He says that '[w]hatever view we take
... , we want the right to decide for ourselves, and so we should there-
fore be ready to insist that any honorable constitution, any genuine
constitution of principle, will guarantee that right for everyone'.'
But the guarantee he proposes is worthless. While exposing almost
everyone to violations of a true right (not to be deliberately killed), it
would secure for few the supposed 'right to decide for themselves'
but for many more would transfer to doctors the discretion to grant
or withhold autonomy itself. And in exercising their discretion, the
doctors, like those petitioning them for their lethal attentions, would
be proceeding on a radically false valuation of the value and dignity
of human life. We should not treat 'the values in question' as 'trivial
enough' to allow doctors, judges, and other powerful people to im-
pose this false valuation by whittling down and circumventing the law
of murder.
Do we hear this talk of 'official orthodoxy' when it comes to
matters like slavery or pedophilia? A just society cannot be main-
tained, and people cannot be treated with the equal concern and re-
spect to which they are all entitled, unless we hold fast to the truth-
or, if you will, the axiom-that none of us is entitled to act on the
opinion that the life of another is not worth living. To trash this
truth-or axiom-as a mere, unconstitutional 'official orthodoxy' is
to discard the very foundations of just and equal respect for persons
in their liberty, their pursuit of happiness, and their life.
a bit more gloomy about the whole business and its impact on the
Health Department .... The greatest fear and reluctance about the
legislation would appear to be coming from Aboriginal Health
Workers themselves .... [F]eelings about the legislation are far more
widespread than originally envisaged, that is, they are not limited to
those communities who have strong "Church" followings ....
Report by Chips Mackinolty to the Northern Territory of Australia Legislative
Committee for Aboriginal Affairs (July 23, 1996) (on file with author).
76. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 217.
77. See id. at 239.
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